














































N apparent ethical dilemma arises when physi-
cians consider enrolling their patients in ran-
domized clinical trials. Suppose that a randomized
clinical trial comparing two treatments is in progress,
and a physician has an opinion about which treat-
ment is better. The physician has a duty to promote
the patient’s best medical interests and therefore
seems to be obliged to advise the patient to receive
the treatment that the physician prefers. This duty
creates a barrier to the enrollment of patients in ran-
domized clinical trials.1-10 Two strategies are often
used to resolve the dilemma in favor of enrolling pa-
tients in clinical trials. 
THE “EITHER YOU KNOW WHICH IS 
BETTER OR YOU DON’T” STRATEGY
According to one strategy, physicians should not
recommend one treatment over another if they do
not really know which one is better, and they do not
really know which treatment is better in the absence
of data from randomized clinical trials.11 Data from
uncontrolled studies are often influenced by the de-
sire on both the investigator’s part and the patient’s
part to obtain positive results.12 Journal editors are
more likely to publish reports of studies with posi-
tive results than reports of studies with negative re-
sults.13 A treatment recommendation based on weak-
er evidence than that obtained from a randomized
clinical trial is like a recommendation based on a
mere hunch or an idiosyncratic preference.14 Thus,
according to this argument, in the absence of data
from a randomized clinical trial, evidence that pro-
vides an adequate basis for recommending a treat-
ment rarely exists, and the enrollment dilemma is
based on a mistake.
This strategy for resolving the dilemma is simplis-
tic. It assumes that evidence available to physicians
can be only one of two kinds: gold-standard evi-
dence or worthless prejudice. But clinical judgments
may be based on evidence of intermediate quality,
including physicians’ experience with their own pa-
tients, their conversations with colleagues concern-
ing their colleagues’ experience, their evaluation of
the results of nonrandomized studies reported in the
literature, their judgment about the mechanism of
action of one or both treatments, or their view of
the natural history of a given disease. Evidence need
not be conclusive to be valuable; it need not be de-
finitive to be suggestive. Because all good physicians
A
allow evidence of intermediate quality to influence
their professional judgment when a relevant random-
ized clinical trial is not being conducted, it is unrea-
sonable to claim that such evidence has no worth
when a relevant randomized clinical trial is being
conducted. Therefore, the “either you know which
is better or you don’t” strategy for dealing with the
enrollment dilemma is not persuasive.
ADOPTING A LESS STRICT THERAPEUTIC 
OBLIGATION
The dilemma about enrolling patients in random-
ized clinical trials is generated by the claim that a phy-
sician has a strict therapeutic obligation to inform the
patients of the physician’s treatment preference, even
when the preference is based on evidence that is not
of the highest quality. The dilemma could be resolved
if the physician’s therapeutic obligation were less
strict. This strategy was developed by Freedman.14,15
He argued that the standard for determining wheth-
er a physician has engaged in medical malpractice or
committed some other violation punishable by a
professional disciplinary body is the standard of good
practice as determined by a consensus of the medical
community. There is no consensus about which
of two treatments being compared in a randomized
clinical trial is superior. (Otherwise, why conduct
the trial?) Therefore, enrolling a patient in the trial
does not violate the physician’s therapeutic obliga-
tion to the patient, regardless of the physician’s treat-
ment preference. In addition, a patient who consults
a physician with a preference for treatment A could
have consulted a physician who preferred treatment B.
Therefore, enrolling a patient in a randomized clin-
ical trial in order to be randomly assigned (perhaps)
to treatment B does not make such a patient worse
off than he or she would otherwise have been.
Despite these points, compelling arguments for the
stricter interpretation of therapeutic obligation re-
main. In the first place, consider what physicians ex-
pect when they seek professional advice from their
malpractice attorneys, their tax advisors, or for that
matter, their own physicians. Surely they expect —
and believe they have a right to expect — not merely
minimally competent advice, but the best profes-
sional judgments of the professionals they have cho-
sen to consult. In the second place, patients choose
physicians in order to obtain medical advice that is,
in the judgment of those physicians, the best avail-
able. If physicians do not provide such advice, then
they tacitly deceive their patients, unless they dis-
close to their patients that they are not bound by
this strict therapeutic obligation. Physicians should
adopt the strict therapeutic obligation.
A RESOLUTION 
The clash between a strict therapeutic obligation
and a less strict one is only apparent. On the one
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hand, the less strict therapeutic obligation is sup-
ported by the argument that it is morally permissible
to offer to enroll a patient in a randomized clinical
trial. On the other hand, the strict therapeutic obli-
gation is supported by the arguments concerning
treatment recommendations. Recommending is dif-
ferent from offering to enroll. A recognition of this
difference provides the basis for a solution to the di-
lemma. 
Suppose that a randomized clinical trial is being
conducted to compare treatments A and B and that
a physician prefers A and informs the patient of this
preference. All physicians have an obligation to ob-
tain their patients’ informed consent to treatment. A
physician has respected this right only if he or she
explains to the patient the risks and benefits of rea-
sonable alternatives to the recommended treatment
and offers the patient an opportunity to choose an
alternative, if that is feasible. Either treatment B or
enrollment in the trial comparing A and B is a rea-
sonable alternative to treatment A, because presum-
ably, A is not known to be superior to B. Indeed,
there is some evidence that enrollment in a random-
ized clinical trial is a superior therapeutic alternative
when a trial is available.16 Respect for a patient’s val-
ues is a central purpose of informed consent. A par-
ticular patient may place a greater value on partici-
pation in a study that will contribute to medical
progress and to the well-being of patients in the fu-
ture than on the unproved advantages of following
the physician’s recommendation. Therefore, a physi-
cian can both recommend a treatment and ask wheth-
er the patient is willing to enroll in the randomized
clinical trial.
This resolution is based on the recognition that
there can be evidence of the superiority of a treat-
ment that falls short of the gold standard for evi-
dence but is better than worthless. It also takes into
account the good arguments for the view that phy-
sicians have a strict obligation to recommend the
best treatment on the basis of their professional
judgment, even when the recommendation is based
on evidence that falls short of the gold standard.
Nevertheless, because all physicians have an obliga-
tion to take informed consent seriously, because re-
spect for informed consent entails offering a patient
the reasonable alternatives to the recommended treat-
ment, and because enrollment in an appropriate ran-
domized clinical trial is often a reasonable therapeu-
tic option, one could argue that offering a patient
the opportunity to be enrolled in a clinical trial is
not only morally permissible but, in many cases, also
morally obligatory, if a relevant trial is being con-
ducted and if enrollment in it is feasible. Taking in-
formed consent seriously resolves the dilemma about
whether to enroll patients in randomized clinical trials. 
Is this analysis clinically realistic? Some may argue
that if clinicians inform their patients that they prefer
treatment A, then few of their patients will consent
to participate in a trial comparing A with B. Further-
more, many clinicians may be unwilling to invest the
time necessary to explain the option of enrollment
in a trial, particularly if it seems unlikely that a pa-
tient, knowing the physician’s preference for one of
the treatments, will choose to participate in the trial. 
On the other hand, in recent years the public has
been exposed to a barrage of medical information
and misinformation. Explaining to patients the dif-
ference between solid scientific evidence of the mer-
its of a treatment and weaker evidence of its merits
is worthwhile, whether or not a relevant randomized
clinical trial is being conducted. When a relevant tri-
al is being conducted, offering the patient enroll-
ment in the trial should not impose on the physician
a large, additional burden of explanation. Physicians
can promote enrollment by explaining that their
preference is based only on limited evidence, which
may or may not be reliable. They can also explain
that data from randomized clinical trials have often
shown that the initial studies of new treatments were
overly optimistic.17 
In addition, using this informed-consent strategy
to resolve the enrollment dilemma may not be mor-
ally optional. My analysis is based on two important
obligations of physicians. The first is the strict obli-
gation to recommend the treatment that is, in the
physician’s professional judgment, the best choice
for the patient. The second is the obligation to ob-
tain the patient’s informed consent to the recom-
mended treatment. The duty of obtaining informed
consent implies that the physician is obligated to of-
fer the patient the opportunity to enroll in a clinical
trial when one is available, even if the physician has
a treatment preference. The physician owes this duty
to the individual patient, not simply to future pa-
tients who may benefit from advances in medical
knowledge. Thus, the informed-consent strategy for
resolving the dilemma about enrolling patients in
randomized clinical trials leads to the conclusion
that physicians have a greater duty to offer their pa-
tients enrollment in trials than has previously been
realized. A strict, thoroughly defensible, therapeutic
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